1 Throughout this paper, the terms "value portfolio" and "high BM portfolio" are used synonymously. Although other valuebased, or contrarian, strategies exist, this paper focuses on a high book-to-market ratio strategy.
Section 1: Introduction
This paper examines whether a simple accounting-based fundamental analysis strategy, when applied to a broad portfolio of high book-to-market (BM) firms, can shift the distribution of returns earned by an investor. Considerable research documents the returns to a high book-to-market investment strategy (e.g., Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein 1984; Fama and French 1992; and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1994) . However, the success of that strategy relies on the strong performance of a few firms, while tolerating the poor performance of many deteriorating companies. In particular, I document that less than 44% of all high BM firms earn positive market-adjusted returns in the two years following portfolio formation.
Given the diverse outcomes realized within that portfolio, investors could benefit by discriminating, ex ante, between the eventual strong and weak companies. This paper asks whether a simple, financial statement-based heuristic, when applied to these out-of-favor stocks, can discriminate between firms with strong prospects and those with weak prospects. In the process, I discover interesting regularities about the performance of the high BM portfolio and provide some evidence supporting the predictions of recent behavioral finance models.
High book-to-market firms offer a unique opportunity to investigate the ability of simple fundamental analysis heuristics to differentiate firms. First, value stocks tend to be neglected. As a group, these companies are thinly followed by the analyst community and are plagued by low levels of investor interest. Given this lack of coverage, analyst forecasts and stock recommendations are unavailable for these firms. Second, these firms have limited access to most "informal" information dissemination channels, and their voluntary disclosures may not be viewed as credible given their poor recent performance. Therefore, financial statements represent both the most reliable and accessible source of information about these firms. Third, high BM firms tend to be "financially distressed"; as a result, the valuation of these firms focuses on accounting fundamentals such as leverage, liquidity, profitability trends, and cash flow adequacy. These fundamental characteristics are most readily obtained from historical financial statements. This paper's goal is to show that investors can create a stronger value portfolio by using simple screens based on historical financial performance.
1 If effective, the differentiation of eventual "winners" from "losers" should shift the distribution of the returns earned by a value investor. The results show that such differentiation is possible. First, I show that the mean return earned by a high book-to-market investor can be increased by at least 7H% annually through the selection of financially strong high BM firms. Second, the entire distribution of realized returns is shifted to the right. Although the portfolio's mean return is the relevant benchmark for performance evaluation, this paper also provides evidence that the left tail of the return distribution (i.e., 10th percentile, 25th percentile, and median) experiences a significant positive shift after the application of fundamental screens. Third, an investment strategy that buys expected winners and shorts expected losers generates a 23% annual return between 1976 and 1996. Returns to this strategy are shown to be robust across time and to controls for alternative investment strategies.
Fourth, the ability to differentiate firms is not confined to one particular financial statement analysis approach. Additional tests document the success of using alternative, albeit complementary, measures of historical financial performance.
Fifth, this paper contributes to the finance literature by providing evidence on the predictions of recent behavioral models (such as Hong and Stein 1999; Barbaris, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998; and Daniel, Hirshleifer. and Subrahmanyam 1998) . Similar to the momentum-related evidence presented in Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) , I find that the positive market-adjusted return earned by a generic high book-to-market strategy disappears in rapid information-dissemination environments (large firms, firms with analyst following, high share-turnover firms). More importantly, the effectiveness of the fundamental analysis strategy to differentiate value firms is greatest in slow information-dissemination environments.
Finally, I show that the success of the strategy is based on the ability to predict future firm performance and the market's inability to recognize these predictable patterns. Firms with weak current signals have lower future earnings realizations and are five times more likely to delist for performance-related reasons than firms with strong current signals. In addition, I provide evidence that the market is systematically "surprised" by the future earnings announcements of these two groups. Measured as the sum of the three-day market reactions around the subsequent four quarterly earnings announcements, announcement period returns for predicted "winners" are 0.041 higher than similar returns for predicted losers.
This one-year announcement return difference is comparable in magnitude to the four-quarter "value" versus "glamour" announcement return difference observed in LaPorta et al. (1997) . Moreover, approximately Ò/^of total annual return difference between ex ante strong and weak firms is earned over just 12 trading days.
The results of this study suggest that strong performers are distinguishable from eventual underperformers through the contextual use of relevant historical information. The ability to discriminate ex ante between future successful and unsuccessful firms and profit from the strategy suggests that the market does not efficiently incorporate past financial signals into current stock prices.
The next section of this paper reviews the prior literature on both "value"
investing and financial statement analysis and defines the nine financial signals that I use to discriminate between firms. Section 3 presents the research design and empirical tests employed in the paper, while section 4 presents the basic results about the success of the fundamental analysis strategy. Section 5 provides robustness checks on the main results, while section 6 briefly examines alternative methods of categorizing a firm's historical performance and financial condition.
Section 7 presents evidence on the source and timing of the portfolio returns, while section 8 concludes.
Section 2: Literature Review and Motivation
High book-to-market investment strategy
This paper examines a refined investment strategy based on a firm's book-tomarket ratio (BM). Prior research (Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein 1984; Fama and French 1992; Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1994) shows that a portfolio of high BM firms outperforms a portfolio of low BM firms. Such strong return performance has been attributed to both market efficiency and market inefficiency. In Fama and French (1992) , BM is characterized as a variable capturing financial distress, and thus the subsequent returns represent a fair compensation for risk. This interpretation is supported by the consistently low return on equity associated with high BM firms (Fama and French 1995; Penman 1991 ) and a strong relation between BM, leverage, and other financial measures of risk (Fama and French 1992; Chen and Zhang 1998) . A second explanation for the observed return difference between high and low BM firms is market mispricing. In particular, high BM firms represent "neglected" stocks where poor prior performance has led to the formation of "too pessimistic" expectations about future performance (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1994) . This pessimism unravels in the future periods, as evidenced by positive earnings surprises at subsequent quarterly earnings announcements (LaPorta et al. 1997) .
Ironically, as an investment strategy, analysts do not recommend high BM firms when forming their buy/sell recommendations (Stickel 1998) . One potential explanation for this behavior is that, on an individual stock basis, the typical value firm will underperform the market and analysts recognize that the strategy relies on purchasing a complete portfolio of high BM firms.
From a valuation perspective, value stocks are inherently more conducive to financial statement analysis than growth (i.e., glamour) stocks. Growth stock valuations are typically based on long-term forecasts of sales and the resultant cash flows, with most investors heavily relying on nonfinancial information. Moreover, most of the predictability in growth stock returns appears to be momentum driven (Asness 1997) . In contrast, the valuation of value stocks should focus on recent changes in firm fundamentals (e.g., financial leverage, liquidity, profitability, and cash flow adequacy). The assessment of these characteristics is most readily accomplished through a careful study of historical financial statements.
Prior fundamental analysis research
One approach to separate ultimate winners from losers is through the identification of a firm's intrinsic value and/or systematic errors in market expectations. The strategy presented in Frankel and Lee (1998) requires investors to purchase stocks whose prices appear to be lagging fundamental values. Undervaluation is identified by using analysts' earnings forecasts in conjunction with an accounting-based valuation model (e.g., residual income model), and the strategy is successful at generating significant positive returns over a three-year investment window. Similarly, Dechow and Sloan (1997) and LaPorta (1996) find that systematic errors in market expectations about long-term earnings growth can partially explain the success of contrarian investment strategies and the book-to-market effect, respectively.
As a set of neglected stocks, high BM firms are not likely to have readily available forecast data. In general, financial analysts are less willing to follow poor performing, low-volume, and small firms (Hayes 1998; McNichols and O'Brien 1997) , while managers of distressed firms could face credibility issues when trying to voluntary communicate forward-looking information to the capital markets (Koch 1999; Miller and Piotroski 2002) . Therefore, a forecast-based approach, such as Frankel and Lee (1998) , has limited application for differentiating value stocks.
Numerous research papers document that investors can benefit from trading on various signals of financial performance. Contrary to a portfolio investment strategy based on equilibrium risk and return characteristics, these approaches seek to earn "abnormal" returns by focusing on the market's inability to fully process the implications of particular financial signals. Examples of these strategies include, but are not limited to, post-earnings announcement drift (Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990; Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin 1984) , accruals (Sloan 1996) , seasoned equity offerings (Loughran and Ritter 1995) , share repurchases (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 1995) , and dividend omissions/decreases (Michaely, Thaler, and Womack 1995) .
A more dynamic investment approach involves the use of multiple pieces of information imbedded in the firm's financial statements. Ou and Penman (1989) show that an array of financial ratios created from historical financial statements can accurately predict future changes in earnings, while Holthausen and Larcker (1992) show that a similar statistical model could be used to successfully predict future excess returns directly. A limitation of these two studies is the use of complex methodologies and a vast amount of historical information to make the necessary predictions. To overcome these calculation costs and avoid overfitting the data, Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) utilize 12 financial signals claimed to be useful to financial analysts. Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) show that these fundamental signals 2 The signals used in this study were identified through professional and academic articles. It is important to note that these signals do not represent, nor purport to represent, the optimal set of performance measures for distinguishing good investments from bad investments. Statistical techniques such as factor analysis may more aptly extract an optimal combination of signals, but such an approach has costs in terms of implementability.
are correlated with contemporaneous returns after controlling for current earnings innovations, firm size, and macroeconomic conditions.
Since the market may not completely impound value-relevant information in a timely manner, Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) investigate the ability of Lev and Thiagarajan's (1993) signals to predict future changes in earnings and future revisions in analyst earnings forecasts. They find evidence that these factors can explain both future earnings changes and future analyst revisions. Consistent with these findings, Abarbanell and Bushee (1998) document that an investment strategy based on these 12 fundamental signals yields significant abnormal returns.
This paper extends prior research by using context-specific financial performance measures to differentiate strong and weak firms. Instead of examining the relationships between future returns and particular financial signals, I aggregate the information contained in an array of performance measures and form portfolios on the basis of a firm's overall signal. By focusing on value firms, the benefits to financial statement analysis (1) are investigated in an environment where historical financial reports represent both the best and most relevant source of information about the firm's financial condition and (2) are maximized through the selection of relevant financial measures given the underlying economic characteristics of these high BM firms.
Financial performance signals used to differentiate high BM firms
The average high BM firm is financially distressed (e.g., Fama and French 1995; Chen and Zhang 1998) . This distress is associated with declining and/or persistently low margins, profits, cash flows, and liquidity and rising and/or high levels of financial leverage. Intuitively, financial variables that reflect changes in these economic conditions should be useful in predicting future firm performance. This logic is used to identify the financial statement signals incorporated in this paper.
I chose nine fundamental signals to measure three areas of the firm's financial condition: profitability, financial leverage/liquidity, and operating efficiency.
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The signals used are easy to interpret and implement, and they have broad appeal as summary performance statistics. In this paper, I classify each firm's signal realization as either "good" or "bad," depending on the signal's implication for future prices and profitability. An indicator variable for the signal is equal to one (zero) if the signal's realization is good (bad). I define the aggregate signal measure, F_SCORE, as the sum of the nine binary signals. The aggregate signal is designed to measure the overall quality, or strength, of the firm's financial position, and the decision to purchase is ultimately based on the strength of the aggregate signal.
It is important to note that the effect of any signal on profitability and prices can be ambiguous. In this paper, the stated ex ante implication of each signal is zero profits and zero cash flow from operations were chosen for two reasons. First, a substantial portion of high BM firms (41.6%) experience a loss in the prior two fiscal years; therefore, positive earnings realizations are nontrivial events for these firms. Second, this is an easy benchmark to implement since it does not rely on industry, market-level, or time-specific comparisons. An alternative benchmark is whether the firm generates positive industry-adjusted profits or cash flows.
Results using "industry-adjusted" factors are not substantially different than the main portfolio results presented in Table 3 .
conditioned on the fact that these firms are financially distressed at some level.
For example, an increase in leverage can, in theory, be either a positive (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1990) or negative (Myers and Majluf 1984; Miller and Rock 1985) signal. However, for financially distressed firms, the negative implications of increased leverage seem more plausible than the benefits garnered through a reduction of agency costs or improved monitoring. To the extent the implications of these signals about future performance are not uniform across the set of high BM firms, the power of the aggregate score to differentiate between strong and weak firms will ultimately be reduced. The relationship between earnings and cash flow levels is also considered. Sloan (1996) shows that earnings driven by positive accrual adjustments (i.e., profits are greater than cash flow from operations) is a bad signal about future profitability and returns. This relationship may be particularly important among value firms, where the incentive to manage earnings through positive accruals (e.g., to prevent covenant violations) is strong (e.g., Sweeney 1994 ⌬LEVER captures changes in the firm's long-term debt levels. I measure ⌬LEVER as the historical change in the ratio of total long-term debt to average total assets, and view an increase (decrease) in financial leverage as a negative (positive) signal. By raising external capital, a financially distressed firm is signaling its inability to generate sufficient internal funds (e.g., Myers and Majluf 1984, Miller and Rock 1985) . In addition, an increase in long-term debt is likely to place additional constraints on the firm's financial flexibility. I define the indicator variable F_ ⌬LEVER to equal one (zero) if the firm's leverage ratio fell (rose) in the year preceding portfolio formation.
The variable ⌬LIQUID measures the historical change in the firm's current ratio between the current and prior year, where I define the current ratio as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities at fiscal year-end. I assume that an improvement in liquidity (i.e., ⌬LIQUID Ͼ 0) is a good signal about the firm's ability to service current debt obligations. The indicator variable F_⌬LIQUID equals one if the firm's liquidity improved, zero otherwise.
I define the indicator variable EQ_OFFER to equal one if the firm did not issue common equity in the year preceding portfolio formation, zero otherwise. Similar to an increase in long-term debt, financially distressed firms that raise external capital could be signaling their inability to generate sufficient internal funds to service future obligations (e.g., Myers and Majluf 1984; Miller and Rock 1985) .
Moreover, the fact that these firms are willing to issue equity when their stock prices are likely to be depressed (i.e., high cost of capital) highlights the poor financial condition facing these firms.
Financial performance signals: Operating efficiency
The remaining two signals are designed to measure changes in the efficiency of the firm's operations: ⌬MARGIN and ⌬TURN. These ratios are important because they reflect two key constructs underlying a decomposition of return on assets.
I define ⌬MARGIN as the firm's current gross margin ratio (gross margin scaled by total sales) less the prior year's gross margin ratio. An improvement in margins signifies a potential improvement in factor costs, a reduction in inventory costs, or a rise in the price of the firm's product. The indicator variable F_ ⌬MARGIN equals one if ⌬MARGIN is positive, zero otherwise.
I define ⌬TURN as the firm's current year asset turnover ratio (total sales scaled by beginning of the year total assets) less the prior year's asset turnover
ratio. An improvement in asset turnover signifies greater productivity from the asset base. Such an improvement can arise from more efficient operations (fewer assets generating the same levels of sales) or an increase in sales (which could also signify improved market conditions for the firm's products). The indicator variable F_ ⌬TURN equals one if ⌬TURN is positive, zero otherwise.
As expected, several of the signals used in this paper overlap with constructs tested in Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and Abarbanell and Bushee (1997, 1998 examine smaller, more financially distressed firms and the variables were chosen to measure profitability and default risk trends relevant for these companies.
Effects from signals such as LIFO/FIFO inventory choices, capital expenditure decisions, effective tax rates, and qualified audit opinions would likely be secondorder relative to broader variables capturing changes in the overall health of these companies. 4 Second, the work of Bernard (1994) and Sloan (1996) demonstrates the importance of accounting returns and cash flows (and their relation to each other) when assessing the future performance prospects of a firm. As such, variables capturing these constructs are central to the current analysis. Finally, neither Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) nor Abarbanell and Bushee (1997, 1998) purport to offer the optimal set of fundamental signals; therefore, the use of alternative, albeit complementary, signals demonstrates the broad applicability of financial statement analysis techniques.
Composite score
As indicated earlier, I define F_SCORE as the sum of the individual binary signals, or
Given the nine underlying signals, F_SCORE can range from a low of 0 to a high of 9, where a low (high) F_SCORE represents a firm with very few (mostly) good signals. To the extent current fundamentals predict future fundamentals, I expect F_SCORE to be positively associated with changes in future firm performance and stock returns. The investment strategy discussed in this paper is based on selecting firms with high F_SCORE signals, instead of purchasing firms based on the relative realization of any particular signal. In comparison to the work of Ou and Penman (1989) and Holthausen and Larker (1992) , this paper represents a "step-back" in the analysis process-probability models need not be estimated nor does the data need to be fitted on a year-by-year basis when implementing the investment strategy. Instead, the investment decision is based on the sum of these nine binary signals.
This approach represents one simple application of fundamental analysis for identifying strong and weak value firms. In selecting this methodology, two issues arise. First, the translation of the factors into binary signals could potentially eliminate useful information. I adopted the binary signal approach because it is simple and easy to implement. An alternative specification would be to aggregate continuous representations of these nine factors. For robustness, the main results of this paper are also presented using an alternative methodology where the signal realizations are annually ranked and summed.
Second, given a lack of theoretical justification for the combined use of these particular variables, the methodology employed in this paper could be perceived as ad hoc. Since the goal of the methodology is to merely separate strong value firms from weak value firms, alternative measures of financial health at the time of portfolio formation should also be successful at identifying these firms. I investigate several alternative measures in section 6.
Section 3: Research Design

Sample selection
Each year between 1976 and 1996, I identify firms with sufficient stock price and book value data on COMPUSTAT. For each firm, I calculate the market value of equity and BM ratio at fiscal year-end. 
Calculation of returns
I measure firm-specific returns as one-year (two-year) buy-and-hold returns earned from the beginning of the fifth month after the firm's fiscal year-end through the earliest subsequent date: one year (two years) after return compounding began or the last day of CRSP traded returns. If a firm delists, I assume the delisting return is zero. I chose the fifth month to ensure that the necessary annual financial information is available to investors at the time of portfolio formation. I define market-adjusted returns as the buy-and-hold return less the value-weighted market return over the corresponding time period.
Description of the empirical tests (main results section)
The primary methodology of this paper is to form portfolios based on the firm's aggregate score (F_SCORE). I classify firms with the lowest aggregate signals (F_SCORE equals 0 or 1) as low F_SCORE firms and expect these firms to have S e l e c t e d P a p e r N u m b e r 8 4 10 5 Fiscal year-end prices are used to create consistency between the BM ratio used for portfolio assignments and the ratio used to determine BM and size cutoffs. Basing portfolio assignments on market values calculated at the date of portfolio inclusion does not impact the tenor of the results. 6 Since each firm's book-to-market ratio is calculated at a different point in time (i.e., due to different fiscal yearends), observations are grouped by and ranked within financial report years. For example, all observations related to fiscal year 1986 are grouped together to determine the FY86 size and book-tomarket cutoffs. Any observation related to fiscal year 1987 (regardless of month and date of its fiscal year-end) is then assigned to a size and BM portfolio based on the distribution of those FY86 observations. This approach guarantees that the prior year's ratios and cutoff points are known prior to any current year portfolio assignments. 7 Since prior year distributions are used to create the high BM the worst subsequent stock performance. Alternatively, firms receiving the highest score (i.e., F_SCORE equals 8 or 9) have the strongest fundamental signals and are classified as high F_SCORE firms. I expect these firms to have the best subsequent return performance given the strength and consistency of their fundamental signals. I design the tests in this paper to examine whether the high F_SCORE portfolio outperforms other portfolios of firms drawn from the high BM portfolio.
The first test compares the returns earned by high F_SCORE firms against the returns of low F_SCORE firms; the second test compares high F_SCORE firms against the complete portfolio of all high BM firms. Given concerns surrounding the use of parametric test statistics in a long-run return setting (e.g., Kothari and Warner 1997; Barber and Lyon 1997) , the primary results are tested using both tradition t-statistics as well as implementing a bootstrapping approach to test for differences in portfolio returns.
The test of return differences between the high and low F_SCORE portfolios with bootstrap techniques is as follows: First, I randomly select firms from the complete portfolio of high BM firms and assign them to either a pseudohigh F_SCORE portfolio or a pseudo-low F_SCORE portfolio. This assignment continues until each pseudo-portfolio consists of the same number of observations as the actual high and low F_SCORE portfolios (number of observations equals 1,448 and 396, respectively). Second, I calculate the difference between the mean returns of these two pseudo-portfolios and this difference represents an observation under the null of no difference in mean return performance.
Third, I repeat this process 1,000 times to generate 1,000 observed differences in returns under the null, and the empirical distribution of these return differences is used to test the statistical significance of the actual observed return differences. Finally, to test the effect of the fundamental screening criteria on the properties of the entire return distribution, I also calculate differences in pseudo-portfolio returns for six different portfolio return measures: mean returns, median returns, 10th percentile, 25th percentile, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile returns.
The test of return differences between high F_SCORE firms and all high BM firms is constructed in a similar manner. Each iteration, I randomly form a pseudo-portfolio of high F_SCORE firms, and the returns of the pseudo-portfolio are compared against the returns of the entire high BM portfolio, thereby generating a difference under the null of no-return difference. I repeat this process 1,000 times, and the empirically derived distribution of return differences is used to test the actual difference in returns between the high F_SCORE portfolio and all high BM firms. I discuss these empirical results in the next section. P i o t r o s k i 11 portfolio (in order to eliminate concerns about a peek-ahead bias), annual allocations to the highest book-to-market portfolio do not remain a constant proportion of all available observations for a given fiscal year. In particular, this methodology leads to larger (smaller) samples of high BM firms in years where the overall market declines (rises). The return differences documented in section 4 do not appear to be related to these time-specific patterns. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics about the financial characteristics of the high book-to-market portfolio of firms, as well as evidence on the long-run returns from such a portfolio. As shown in panel A, the average (median) firm in the highest book-to-market quintile of all firms has a mean (median) BM ratio of 2.444 (1.721) and an end-of-year market capitalization of 188.50 (14.37) million dollars. Consistent with the evidence presented in Fama and French (1995) , the portfolio of high BM firms consists of poor performing firms; the average (median) ROA realization is -0.0054 (0.0128), and the average and median firm saw declines 
Section 4: Empirical Results
Descriptive evidence about high book-to-market firms
ASSETS
Total assets reported at the end of the fiscal year t.
BM
Book value of equity at the end of fiscal year t, scaled by MVE.
ROA
Net income before extraordinary items for the fiscal year preceding portfolio formation scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t.
⌬ROA Change in annual ROA for the year preceding portfolio formation. ⌬ROA is calculated as ROA for year t less the firm's ROA for year t-1.
⌬MARGIN
Gross margin (net sales less cost of good sold) for the year preceding portfolio formation, scaled by net sales for the year, less the firm's gross margin (scaled by net sales) from year t-1.
CFO
Cash flow from operations scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t.
⌬LIQUID
Change in the firm's current ratio between the end of year t and year t-1.
Current ratio is defined as total current assets divided by total current liabilities.
⌬LEVER
Change in the firm's debt-to-assets ratio between the end of year t and year t-1.
The debt-to-asset ratio is defined as the firm's total long-term debt (including the portion of long-term debt classified as current) scaled by average total assets.
⌬TURN
Change in the firm's asset turnover ratio between the end of year t and year t-1. The asset turnover ratio is defined as net sales scaled by average total assets for the year.
ACCRUAL
Net income before extraordinary items less cash flow from operations, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t.
1yr (2yr)
12-(24-) month buy-and-hold return of the firm starting at the beginning of the Raw Return fifth month after fiscal year-end. Return compounding ends the earlier of one year (two years) after return compounding started or the last day of CRSP reported trading. If the firm delisted, the delisting return is assumed to be zero.
Market-adjusted
Buy-and-hold return of the firm less the buy-and-hold return on the value-weighted Return market index over the same investment horizon.
in both ROA (-0.0096 and -0.0047, respectively) and gross margin (-0.0324 and -0.0034, respectively) over the last year. Finally, the average high BM firm saw an increase in leverage and a decrease in liquidity over the prior year.
Panel B presents one-year and two-year buy-and-hold returns for the complete portfolio of high BM firms, along with the percentage of firms in the portfolio with positive raw and market-adjusted returns over the respective investment horizon. Consistent with Fama and French (1992) and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) , the high BM firms earn positive market-adjusted returns in the one-year and two-year periods following portfolio formation. Yet despite the strong mean performance of this portfolio, a majority of the firms (approximately 57%) earn negative market-adjusted returns over the one-and two-year windows.
Therefore, any strategy that can eliminate the left tail of the return distribution (i.e., the negative return observations) will greatly improve the portfolio's mean return performance. Table 2 presents spearman correlations between the individual fundamental signal indicator variables, the aggregate fundamental signal score F_SCORE, and the one-year and two-year buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns. As expected, F_SCORE has a significant positive correlation with both one-year and two-year future returns (0.121 and 0.130, respectively). For comparison, the two strongest individual explanatory variables are ROA and CFO (correlation of 0.086 and 0.096, respectively, with one-year-ahead market-adjusted returns). Table 3 presents the returns to the fundamental investment strategy. Panel A presents one-year market-adjusted returns; inferences, patterns and results are similar using raw returns (panel B) and a two-year investment horizon (panel C). This discussion and subsequent analysis will focus on one-year market-adjusted returns for succinctness.
Returns to a fundamental analysis strategy
Most of the observations are clustered around F_SCORES between 3 and 7,
indicating that a vast majority of the firms have conflicting performance signals.
However, 1,448 observations are classified as high F_SCORE firms (scores of 8 or 9), while 396 observations are classified as low F_SCORE firms (scores of 0 or 1).
I will use these extreme portfolios to test the ability of fundamental analysis to differentiate between future winners and losers. The return improvements also extend beyond the mean performance of the various portfolios. As discussed in the introduction, this investment approach is designed to shift the entire distribution of returns earned by a high BM investor. (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) -- (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) --a A raw return is calculated as the 12-month buy-and-hold return of the firm starting at the beginning of the fifth month after fiscal year-end. Return compounding ends the earlier of one year after return compounding starts or the last day of CRSP reported trading. If the firm delisted, the delisting return is assumed to be zero.
b A market-adjusted return equals the firm's 12-month buy-and-hold return (as defined in panel A) less the buy-and-hold return on the value-weighted market index over the same investment horizon.
c A two-year raw return is calculated as the 24-month buy-and-hold return of the firm starting at the beginning of the fifth month after fiscal year end. Return compounding ends the earlier of two years after return compounding starts or the last day of CRSP reported trading. If the firm delisted, the delisting return is assumed to be zero. A two-year market-value adjusted return equals the firm's 24-month buy-and-hold return less the buy-and-hold return on the value-weighted market index over the same investment horizon.
f T-statistics for portfolio means (p-values for medians) are from two-sample t-tests (signed rank wilcoxon tests); empirical p-values are from bootstrapping procedures based on 1,000 iterations. P-values for the proportions are based on a binomial test of proportions.
value firms. Specifically, the mean (median) one-year market adjusted return difference between the highest and lowest ranked score quintile is 0.092 (0.113), both significant at the 1% level.
Returns conditional on firm size
A primary concern is whether the excess returns earned using a fundamental analysis strategy is strictly a small firm effect or can be applied across all size categories. For this analysis, I annually rank all firms with the necessary COMPUSTAT data to compute the fundamental signals into three size portfolios (independent of their book-to-market ratio). I define size as the firm's market capitalization at the prior fiscal year-end. Compustat yielded a total of approximately 75,000 observations between 1976 and 1996, of which 14,043 represented high book-to-market firms. Given the financial characteristics of the high BM firms, a preponderance of the firms (8,302) were in the bottom third of market capitalization (59.12%), while 3,906 (27.81%) and 1,835 (13.07%) are assigned to the middle and top size portfolio, respectively. Table 4 presents one-year marketadjusted returns based on these size categories. Table 4 shows that the above-market returns earned by a generic high BM portfolio are concentrated in smaller companies. Applying F_SCORE within each size partition, the strongest benefit from financial statement analysis is also garnered in the small firm portfolio (return difference between high and low F_SCORE firms is 0.270, significant at the 1% level). However, the shift in mean and median returns is still statistically significant in the medium firm size portfolio, with the high score firms earning approximately 7% more than all medium-size firms and 17.3% more than the low F_SCORE firms. Contrarily, differentiation is weak among the largest firms, where most return differences are either statistically insignificant or only marginally significant at the 5% or 10% level. Thus, the improvement in returns is isolated to firms in the bottom two-thirds of market capitalization. 
Alternative partitions
When return predictability is concentrated in smaller firms, an immediate concern is whether or not these returns are realizable. To the extent that the benefits of the trading strategy are concentrated in firms with low share price or low levels of liquidity, observed returns may not reflect an investor's ultimate experience.
For completeness, I examine two other partitions of the sample: share price and trading volume.
Similar to firm size, I place companies into share price and trading volume portfolios based on the prior year's cutoffs for the complete COMPUSTAT sample (i.e., independent of BM quintile assignment). Consistent with these firms' small market capitalization and poor historical performance, a majority of all high BM S e l e c t e d P a p e r N u m b e r 8 4 18
9 These results are consistent with other documented anomalies. For example, Bernard and Thomas (1989) show that the post-earnings announcement drift strategy is more profitable for small firms, with abnormal returns being virtually nonexistent for larger firms. Similarly, Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) show that momentum strategies are strongest in small firms. Further evidence contradicting the stale price and low liquidity argument is provided by partitioning the sample along average share turnover. Consistent with the findings in Lee and Swaminathan (2000) , this analysis shows that a majority of the high BM portfolio's "winners" are in the low share turnover portfolio. For these high BM firms, the average market-adjusted return (before the application of fundamental analysis screens) is 0.101. This evidence suggests, ex ante, that the greatest information gains rest with the most thinly traded and most out-of-favored stocks.
Consistent with those potential gains, the low volume portfolio experiences a large return to the fundamental analysis strategy; however, the strategy is successful across all trading volume partitions. Whereas the difference between high minus low F_SCORE firms is 0.239 in the low volume portfolio, the return difference in the high volume partition is 0.203 (both differences are significant at the 1% level).
The combined evidence suggests that benefits to financial statement analysis are not likely to disappear after accounting for a low share price effect or additional transaction costs associated with stale prices or thinly traded securities. However, one caveat does exist: although the high minus low F_SCORE return differences for the large share price and high volume partitions are statistically significant, the return differences between the high F_SCORE firms and all high BM firms are not significant for these partitions. And, within the large share price partition, the mean and median return differences are (insignificantly) negative. These results, however, do not eradicate the claimed effectiveness of financial statement analysis for these subsamples. Despite an inability to identify strong companies, the analysis can successfully identify and eliminate firms with extreme negative returns (i.e., the low F_SCORE firms). Additional tests reveal that the two portfolios of low F_SCORE firms significantly underperform all high BM firms with the corresponding share price and trading volume attributes. Thus, within these partitions of the high BM portfolio, the benefits from fundamental analysis truly relate to the original motivation of this study: to eliminate the left-hand tail of the return distribution.
Relationship between analyst following and gains from fundamental analysis
A primary assumption throughout this analysis is that high BM firms are not heavily followed by the investment community. In such a setting, financial statement analysis may be a profitable method of investigating and differentiating firms. If the ability to earn above-market returns is truly driven by information-processing limitations for these companies, then (1) these high BM firms should display low levels of analyst coverage and (2) the ability to earn strong returns should be negatively related to the amount of analyst coverage provide. firms in the sample, or 37.8%, have analyst coverage in the year preceding portfolio formation (as reported on the 1999 I/B/E/S summary tape). For the firms with coverage, the average (median) number of analysts providing a forecast at the end of the prior fiscal year was only 3.15 (2). Based on these statistics, it appears that the analyst community neglects most high BM firms. Consistent with slow information processing for neglected firms, the superior returns earned by a generic high BM portfolio are concentrated in firms without analyst coverage. High BM firms without analyst coverage significantly outperform the value-weighted market index by 0.101, while those firms with analyst coverage simply earn the market return. In addition, the gains from financial statement analysis are also greatest for the group of firms without analyst coverage. Although financial statement analysis can be successfully applied to both sets of firms, the average return difference between high and low F_SCORE firms is 0.277 for the firms without analyst following compared to 0.114 for the firms with analyst coverage.
In conclusion, the evidence suggests that financial statement analysis is fairly robust across all levels of share price, trading volume, and analyst following. The concentration of the greatest benefits among smaller, thinly traded and underfollowed stocks suggests that information-processing limitations could be a significant factor leading to the predictability of future stock returns. Section 7 will address this issue in detail.
Section 5: Other Sources of Cross-Sectional Variation in Returns
Despite all firms being selected annually from the same book-to-market quintile, one source of the observed return pattern could be different risk characteristics across F_SCORE rankings. Alternatively, a correlation between F_SCORE and another known return pattern, such as momentum, accrual reversal, or the effects of seasoned equity offerings, could drive the observed return patterns. This section addresses these issues.
Conceptually, a risk-based explanation is not appealing; the firms with the strongest subsequent return performance appear to have the smallest amount of ex ante financial and operating risk (as measured by the historical performance signals). In addition, small variation in size and book-to-market characteristics across the F_SCORE portfolios [not tabulated] is not likely to account for a 22% differential in observed market-adjusted returns. with F_SCORE. First, underreaction to historical information and financial events, which should be the ultimate mechanism underlying the success of F_SCORE, is also the primary mechanism underlying momentum strategies (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 1996) . Second, historical levels of accruals (Sloan 1996) and recent equity offerings (Loughran and Ritter 1995, Spiess and Affleck-Graves 1995) , both of which have been shown to predict future stock returns, are imbedded in F_SCORE and are thereby correlated with the aggregate return metric. As such, it is important to demonstrate that the financial statement analysis methodology is identifying financial trends above and beyond these other previously documented effects.
To explicitly control for some of these correlated variables, I estimate the following cross-sectional regression within the population of high book-to-market firms:
where MA _RET is the one-year market-adjusted return, MOMENT equals the firm's six-month market-adjusted return prior to portfolio formation, ACCRUAL equals the firm's total accruals scaled by total assets, and EQ_OFFER equals one if the firm issued seasoned equity in the preceding fiscal year, zero otherwise. The coefficients on F_SCORE indicate that, after controlling for size and book-to-market differences, a one-point improvement in the aggregate score (i.e., one additional positive signal) is associated with an approximate 2H% to 3% increase in the one-year market-adjusted return earned subsequent to portfolio formation. More importantly, the addition of variables designed to capture momentum, accrual reversal, and a prior equity issuance has no impact on the robustness of F_SCORE to predict future returns. and Ϫ0.001). This time series of strong positive performance and minimal negative return exposure casts doubt on a risk-based explanation for these return differences. Section 7 will investigate potential information-based explanations for the observed return patterns.
A second concern relates to the potential existence of survivorship issues, especially given the small number of observations in the low F_ SCORE portfolios relative to the high F_ SCORE portfolio. To the extent that there exists a set of firms with poor fundamentals that did not survive (and were not represented 
Panel A presents coefficients from a pooled regression; panel B presents the time-series average coefficients from 21 annual regressions where the t-statistic is based on the distribution of the estimated annual coefficients. MOMENT is equal to the firm's six month market-adjusted buy-and-hold return over the six months preceding the date of portfolio on Compustat), these missing low F_ SCORE observations would have generated substantial negative returns. The omission of these firms from the study would bias upward the returns being earned by the current low F_SCORE portfolio.
Therefore, the high minus low F_SCORE return differences reported in this paper could be understating the actual return performance associated with this investment strategy.
Alternatively, the high F_ SCORE portfolio could consist of high BM firms recently added by Compustat due to their strong historical performance. Including firm observations from the early years of their "coverage" (i.e., back-filled historical data) could inflate the high F_ SCORE portfolio returns because of the Compustat coverage bias. However, the data requirements of this paper should mitigate this concern. In particular, the variable ⌬ROA requires three years of historical data, so any firm-year observation associated with the first or second year of apparent Compustat "coverage" has insufficient data to calculate F_ SCORE.
Since Compustat adds three years of data when it initiates coverage, the first firmyear observation with sufficient data to be assigned to a portfolio equates to the first year the firm had "real time" coverage by Compustat. Thus, the financial information necessary to calculate F_ SCORE existed at the time of portfolio formation, and the future performance of the firm (after year t) was not a factor in Compustat's decision to cover the firm.
Section 6: Sensitivity Tests: Use of Alternative Measures of Historical Financial Performance to Separate Winners from Losers
One potential criticism of this paper is the use of an ad hoc aggregate performance metric (F_ SCORE) to categorize the financial prospects of the company at the time of portfolio formation. To mitigate this concern, table 7 presents results where the entire portfolio of high BM firms is split based on two accepted measures of firm health and performance: financial distress (Altman's z-score) and historical change in profitability (as measured by the change in return on assets). If these simple measures can also differentiate eventual winners from losers, then concerns about "metric-specific" results should be eliminated. In addition, I test whether the use of an aggregate measure such as F_ SCORE has additional explanatory power above and beyond these two partitioning variables.
Similar to the methodology used for partitioning on firm size, share price, and trading volume, I classify each firm as having either a high, medium, or low level of financial distress and historical change in profitability. As shown in panels A and B of table 7, nearly half of all high book-to-market firms are classified as having high levels of financial distress or poor trends in profitability. return differences between strong/high signal and weak/low signal firms are tested using a twosample t-tested (signed rank wilcoxon test). Strong (weak) firms are defined as the observations below (above) the off-diagonal of the matrix. ⌬MARGIN equals the firm's gross margin (net sales less cost of good sold) for the year preceding portfolio formation, scaled by net sales for the year, less the firm's gross margin (scaled by net sales) from year t-1. ⌬ASSET_ TURN equals the change in the firm's asset turnover ratio between the end of year t and year t-1. The asset turnover ratio is defined as net sales scaled by average total assets for the year. (1998) , who documents an inverse relationship between measures of financial distress and stock returns among a set of CRSP firms facing a reasonable probability of default or bankruptcy. Second, high BM firms with the strongest historical profitability trends also earn significantly higher returns in the subsequent year (0.107 versus 0.037).
14 These results corroborate the evidence and inferences presented using F_ SCORE as the conditioning "information" variable.
After controlling for financial distress and historical changes in profitability, Despite the overall success of these individual metrics, they were unable to differentiate firms along other dimensions of portfolio performance. In particular, neither financial distress nor change in profitability alone was able to consistently shift the median return earned by an investor. The ability to shift the entire distribution of returns appears to be a result of aggregating multiple pieces of financial information to form a more precise "signal" of historical performance. To demonstrate the usefulness of aggregating alternative performance measures, panel C examines one-year market-adjusted returns conditioned on two variables that drive a change in return on assets: change in asset turnover and change in gross margin.
Partitioning ⌬ROA into its two fundamental components provides stronger evidence on the use of simple historical financial information to differentiate firms. First, unconditionally, both metrics provide some information about future performance prospects: firms with strong historical improvements in asset turnover and margins earn the strongest future returns. Second, a joint consideration of the metrics generates stronger predictions of future firm performance.
I define strong (weak) value firms as those observations in the three cells below (above) the off-diagonal of the matrix (i.e., firms with the highest (lowest) 13 The difference in changes in asset turnover and gross margins). As shown, strong (weak) value firms consistently outperform (underperform) the other firms in the high book-tomarket portfolio. The differences in returns between these two groups of firms (mean difference ‫ס‬ 0.102, median difference ‫ס‬ 0.067) are both significant at the 1% level.
The evidence presented in table 7 clearly demonstrates that the ability to discriminate winners from losers is not driven by a single, specific metric.
Instead, future returns are predictable by conditioning on the past performance of the firm. The combined use of relevant performance metrics, such as F_ SCORE or a DuPont-style analysis, simply improves the ability of an investor to distinguish strong companies from weak companies relative to the success garnered from a single, historical measure. Section 7 examines whether the slow processing of financial information is at least partially responsible for the effectiveness of this strategy.
Section 7: Association between Fundamental Signals, Observed Returns, and Market Expectations
This section provides evidence on the mechanics underlying the success of the fundamental analysis investment strategy. First, I examine whether the aggregate score successfully predicts the future economic condition of the firm. Second, I examine whether the strategy captures systematic errors in market expectations about future earnings performance. and future profitability. To the extent these profitability levels are unexpected, a large portion of the excess return being earned by the high F_ SCORE firms over the low F_ SCORE firms could be explained.
Future firm performance conditional on the fundamental signals
The second column presents evidence on the proportion of firms that ultimately delist for performance-related reasons (in the two years subsequent to portfolio formation) conditional on F_ SCORE. I gather delisting data through CRSP and define a performance-related delisting as in Shumway (1997) . 15 The most striking result is the strong negative relationship between a firm's ex ante financial strength (as measured by F_ SCORE) and the probability of a performance-related delisting.
With the exception of slight deviations in the delisting rate for the most extreme firms (F_ SCORE equals 0 or 9), the relationship is nearly monotonic across These results are striking because the observed return and subsequent financial performance patterns are inconsistent with common notions of risk. Fama and French (1992) suggest that the BM effect is related to financial distress. However, the evidence in tables 3 through 8 shows that portfolios of the healthiest value firms yield both higher returns and stronger subsequent financial performance. This 16 The inclusion of delisting returns in the measurement of firmspecific returns would not alter the inferences gleaned from inverse relationship between ex ante risk measures and subsequent returns appears to contradict a risk-based explanation. In contrast, the evidence is consistent with a market that slowly reacts to the good news imbedded within a high BM firm's financial statements. Section 7.2 examines whether the market is systematically surprised at subsequent earnings announcements. Table 9 examines market reactions around subsequent earnings announcements conditional on the historical information. LaPorta et al. (1997) show that investors are overly pessimistic (optimistic) about the future performance prospects of value (glamour) firms, and that these systematic errors in expectations unravel during subsequent earnings announcements. They argue that these reversals in expectations account for a portion of the return differences between value and glamour firms and lead to a systematic pattern of returns around subsequent earnings announcements. LaPorta (1996) and Dechow and Sloan (1997) If these systematic return differences are related to slow information processing, then the earnings announcement results should be magnified (abated) when conditioned on small (large) firms, firms with (without) analyst following, and firms with low (high) share turnover. Consistent with the one-year-ahead results, the differences between the earnings announcement returns of high and low F_ SCORE firms are greatest for small firms, firms without analyst following, and low share turnover firms. For small firms, the four quarter earnings announcement return difference is 5.1%, which represents nearly one-fifth of the entire one-year return difference; conversely, there is no significant difference in announcement returns for large firms [results not tabulated].
Subsequent earnings announcement returns conditional on the fundamental signals
Overall, the pattern of earnings announcement returns, conditional on the past historical information (i.e., F_ SCORE), demonstrates that the success of fundamental analysis is at least partially dependent on the market's inability to fully impound predictable earnings-related information into prices in a timely manner. 
Section 8: Conclusions
This paper demonstrates that a simple accounting-based fundamental analysis strategy, when applied to a broad portfolio of high book-to-market firms, can shift the distribution of returns earned by an investor. Although this paper does not purport to find the optimal set of financial ratios for evaluating the performance prospects of individual "value" firms, the results convincingly demonstrate that investors can use relevant historical information to eliminate firms with poor future prospects from a generic high BM portfolio. I show that the mean return earned by a high book-to-market investor can be increased by at least 7H% annually through the selection of financially strong high BM firms and the entire distribution of realized returns is shifted to the right. In addition, an investment strategy that buys expected winners and shorts expected losers generates a 23% annual return between 1976 and 1996, and the strategy appears to be robust across time and to controls for alternative investment strategies.
Within the portfolio of high BM firms, the benefits to financial statement analysis are concentrated in small and medium-sized firms, companies with low share turnover, and firms with no analyst following and the superior performance is not dependent on purchasing firms with low share prices. A positive relationship between the sign of the initial historical information and both future firm performance and subsequent quarterly earnings announcement reactions suggests that the market initially underreacts to the historical information.
In particular, ⁄/^of the annual return difference between ex ante strong and weak firms is earned over the four three-day periods surrounding these earnings announcements.
Overall, the results are striking because the observed patterns of long-window and announcement-period returns are inconsistent with common notions of risk. Fama and French (1992) suggest that the BM effect is related to financial distress; however, among high BM firms, the healthiest firms appear to generate the strongest returns. The evidence instead supports the view that financial markets slowly incorporate public historical information into prices and that the "sluggishness" appears to be concentrated in low volume, small, and thinly followed firms.
These results also corroborate the intuition behind the "life cycle hypothesis" advanced in Swaminathan (2000a, 2000b) . They conjecture that early stage-momentum losers that continue to post poor performance can become subject to extreme pessimism and experience low volume and investor neglect (i.e., a late stage-momentum loser). Eventually, the average late stage-momentum loser does "recover" and becomes an early stage-momentum winner. The strong value firms in this paper have the same financial and market characteristics as Lee and Swaminathan's late stage-momentum losers. Since it is difficult to identify an individual firm's location in the life cycle, this study suggests that contextual fundamental analysis could be a useful technique to separate late stage-momentum losers (so-called recovering dogs) from early stage-momentum losers.
One limitation of this study is the existence of a potential data-snooping bias.
The financial signals used in this paper are dependent, to some degree, on previously documented results; such a bias could adversely affect the out-of-sample predictive ability of the strategy. Whether the market behavior documented in this paper equates to inefficiency, or is the result of a rational pricing strategy that only appears to be anomalous, is a subject for future research.
Appendix 1 One-Year Market-Adjusted Returns to a Hedge Portfolio Taking a Long Position in Strong F_SCORE Firms and a Short Position in Weak F_SCORE Firms by Calendar Year
This appendix documents one-year market-adjusted returns by calendar year to a hedge portfolio taking a long position in firms with a strong F_SCORE (F_SCORE greater than or equal to 5) and a short position in firms with a poor F_SCORE (F_SCORE less than 5). Returns are cumulated over a one-year period starting four months after fiscal year-end. A market-adjusted return is defined as the firm's twelve-month buy-and-hold return less the buy-and-hold return on the value-weighted market index over the same investment horizon. 
